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Abstract 
We derive new limitations on the information rate and the average information rate of secret 
sharing schemes for access structure represented by graphs. We give the first proof of the 
existente of access structures with optimal information rate and optimal average information 
rate less than 1/2 + E, where E is an arbitrary positive constant. We also consider the Problem of 
testing if one of these access structures is a substructure of an arbitrary access structure and we 
show that this Problem is NP-complete. We provide several general lower bounds on information 
rate and average information rate of graphs. In particular, we show that any graph with n vertices 
admits a secret sharing scheme with information rate Q((log n)/n). 
1. Introduction 
A secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute a secret s among a set of partic- 
ipants 9 in such a way that only qualified subsets of 9 tan reconstruct the value of 
s whereas any other subset of 9, nonqualified to know s, cannot determine anything 
about the value of the secret. We briefly recall the results on secret sharing schemes 
that are more closely related to the topics of this Paper. 
Shamir [38] and Blackley [3] were the first to consider the Problem of secret sharing 
and gave secret sharing schemes where each subset A of 9 of cardinality [Al > k tan 
reconstmct the secret, and any subset A of participants of cardinality IA1 < k have 
absolutely no information on the secret. These schemes are known as (n, k) threshold 
schemes; the value k is the threshold of the scheme and n is the cardinality of 9. 
Ito et al. [27] considered a more general framework and showed how to realize 
a secret sharing scheme for any access structure. An access structure is a family of 
all subsets of 9’ which are qualified to recover the secret. In case of (n, k) threshold 
schemes the access structure consists of all subsets of 9 that have cardinality greater 
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than or equal to k. Their technique requires that the cardinality of set where the shares 
are taken be very large compared to the cardinality of the set where the secret is 
Chosen. Benaloh and Leichter [l] proposed a technique to realize a secret sharing 
scheme for any access structure which is more efficient than the methodology of Ito 
et al. [27]. Benaloh and Leichter showed that there are access structures in which any 
secret sharing scheme must give to some participant a share which is taken from a 
domain strictly larger than that of the secret. 
Bricke11 and Davenport [14] analyzed ideal secret sharing schemes in terms of ma- 
troids. An ideal secret sharing scheme is a scheme for which the shares are taken from 
a set that has the Same cardinality of the set where the secret is Chosen. In particular, 
in case the access structure consists of only those subsets of participants containing 
an edge of a given graph G, Bricke11 and Davenport [14] proved that an ideal secret 
sharing scheme exists if and only if G is a complete multipartite graph. Equivalently, 
if we define the information rate of an access structure as the ratio between the size 
of the secret and that of the largest share given to any participant, Bricke11 and Dav- 
enport’s result tan be stated saying that a graph has information rate 1 if and only if 
it is a complete multipartite graph. 
The Problem of establishing bounds on the size of the shares to be given to par- 
ticipants in secret sharing schemes, or equivalently on the information rate, is one of 
the basic Problem in the area and has received considerable attention by several re- 
searchers. The practical relevante of this issue is based on the following observations: 
Firstly, the security of any System tends to degrade as the amount of information that 
must be kept secret, i.e., the shares of the participants, increases. Secondly, if the shares 
given to participants are too lang, the memory requirements for the participants will 
be too severe and, at the Same time, the shares distribution algorithms will become 
inefficient. Therefore, it is important to derive significative upper and lower bounds on 
the information rate for classes of access structures. Moreover, we Point out that the 
best known schemes to share secrets in general access structures require to generate 
shares of length exponential in the length of the secret and 110 access structure is known 
for which a matthing lower bound tan be proved. Hence, the Problem of closing the 
gap between the lower bound and the upper bound on the information rate of general 
access structures is far from being settled. 
Bricke11 and Stinson [ 161 gave several upper and lower bounds on the information 
rate of access structures based on graphs. Stinson in [43] presented new lower bounds 
on general access structures. Capocelli et al. [ 171 gave the first example of access 
structures with information rate bounded away from 1. 
Blundo et al. [lO] analyzed the information rate and the average information rate 
of secret sharing schemes based on graphs. The average information rate is the ratio 
between the secret size and the arithmetic mean of the size of the shares for such 
schemes. They proved the existente of a gap in the values of information rates for 
graphs, more precisely they strengthened the above quoted result of Bricke11 and Dav- 
enport [14], proving that if a graph G with n vertices is not a complete multipartite 
graph then any secret sharing scheme for it has information rate not greater than $ 
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and average information rate not greater than n/(n + 1). These upper bounds arise by 
applying entropy argument due to Capocelli et al. [ 171. 
A discussion of the best bounds known so far and of our improvements is presented 
in the technical sections of the Paper. 
The recent Survey by Stinson [42] contains an unified description of recent results in 
the area of secret sharing schemes. For different approaches to the study of secret shar- 
ing schemes, for schemes with “extended capabilities” as disenrollment, fault-tolerante, 
and pre-positioning and for a complete bibliography we recommend the Survey article 
by Simmons [41]. 
We also mention some “extended capabilities” of secret sharing schemes that have 
been studied. Papers [2,8] have addressed the Problem of designing secret sharing 
schemes having the additional feature that qualified minorities tan forbid any other 
set of participants from reconstructing the secret. These schemes are referred to as se- 
cret sharing schemes with “Veto” capability. Ingemarsson and Simmons [26] solve the 
question of how to set up a secret sharing scheme in the absence of a trusted party. 
Prepositioned schemes are studied in [40]. The idea of protecting against cheating by 
one or more participants is addressed in [ 15,18,32,37,39,45]. In [4] the authors in- 
vestigated threshold schemes that permit disenrollment of participants. Secret sharing 
schemes in which the dealer has the feature of being able (after a preprocessing Stage) 
to activate a particular access structure out of a given set and/or to allow the participants 
to reconstruct different secrets (in different time instants) by sending to all participants 
the Same broadcast message have been analyzed in [6]. Schemes for sharing several 
nonindependent secrets simultaneously have been analyzed in [ll]; whereas, schemes 
where different secrets are associated with different subsets of participants are con- 
sidered in [7,28]. Recently, Naor and Shamir [35] considered a type of cryptographic 
scheme that is able to decode concealed images without any cryptographic computation. 
They extended it into a visual variant of the (n,k) secret sharing Problem. 
In this Paper we derive new limitations on the information rate and the average 
information rate for access structures represented by graphs. The Paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2 we formally define secret sharing schemes using an information 
theoretical framework. ’ We also define the optimal (average) information rate of an 
access structure d by using the entropy approach. In Section 3 we prove new upper 
bounds on the information rate and the average information rate. These bounds are 
obtained by using the entropy approach introduced in [ 171 and are the best possible 
for the considered structures since we exhibit secret sharing schemes that meet the 
bounds. In particular, we give the first proof of the existente of access structures with 
information rate and average information rate strictly less that f This solves a Problem 
of [ 101. In Section 3.1 we also consider the Problem of efficiently testing if one of these 
low-information-rate access structures is a substructure of an arbitrary access structure. 
This is important since it would immediately give an efficient way to get upper bounds 
’ All the necessary infomation-theoretical definitions are listed in Appendix A, together with the basic 
terminology in graph theory. 
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on the information rate for classes of access structures. Unfortunately, we Show that 
the above decision Problem is NP-complete. In Section 4 we consider the Problem of 
finding good lower bounds on the information rate and the average information rate 
for access structures based on graphs and we give several general lower bounds that 
improve on the previously known results. In particular, we Show that any graph on n 
vertices of maximum degree d admits a secret sharing scheme with information rate 
MCdPl + 1 - rdPl/n). W e P rovide a scheme for any tree with n intemal vertices 
having information rate equal to n/(2n - 1). Finally, we show that any graph with n 
vertices admits a secret sharing scheme with information rate O((log n)/n) and any 
graph with n vertices and m edges admits of a secret sharing scheme with average 
information rate O((nlog n)/(m log(n2/m))). 
2. Secret sharing schemes 
A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set 9 of n partici- 
pants in such a way that only qualified subsets of 9 tan recover the secret, but any 
nonqualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An access structure d 
is the set of all subsets of 9 that tan recover the secret. 
Definition 2.1. Let 9 be a set of participants, a monotone access structure &’ on B 
is a subset & C 2Y\0, such that 
AE&, ACA’CP =+ A’E~. 
Definition 2.2. Let 9 be a set of participants and ~2 2 29. The closure of d, denoted 
by cZ(d), is the set 
For a monotone access structure d we have J&’ = cZ(d). All access structures 
considered in this Paper are monotone. 
Let S be the set of secrets, {p~(s)},~s be a probability distribution on S, and let a 
secret sharing scheme C for secrets in S be fixed. For any participant P E Y, let us 
denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Suppose a dealer 
D wants to a share the secret s E S among the participants in 9 (we will assume 
that D 6 9). He does this by giving each participant P E 9 a share from K(P) 
Chosen according to some, not necessarily uniform, probability distribution. Given a 
set of participants A = (9,). . . ,P } c g, where it < i2 < . . . < i,., denote by K(A) = 
K(q, ) x . . . x K(P ). 
We represent, as in [44], a secret sharing scheme L by a collection of distribution 
rules. A distribution rule is a function 
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which satisfies the conditions f(D) E S and f (Pi) E K(Pi), for i = 1,2,. . . , n. A dis- 
tribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where 
f(D) is the secret being shared, and f(Pi) is the share given to P,. If B is a family 
of distribution rules and s E S, then Fs = {f E 9 : f(D) = s} is the family 
of all distribution rules having s as the secret. If s E S is the value of the se- 
cret that D wants to share, then D will randomly choose a distribution rule f E 
Fs, according to some probability distribution, and use f to distribute shares to the 
participants. 
The family of distribution rules F tan also be depicted as a matrix M, each row 
of which corresponds to one distribution rule. One column of M will be indexed by 
D, and the remaining columns are indexed by the members of 9. 
Any secret sharing scheme for secrets in S and a probability distribution {~s(s)},~s 
naturally induce a probability distribution on K(A), for any A & 9. Denote such proba- 
bility distribution by {J+,~~(u)}~~K(.,Q. Finally, denote by H(S) the entropy of {p~(s)},~~ 
and by H(A) the entropy of {P~~~,(u)}~~K(A), for any A C 9. 
In terms of the probability distribution on the secret and on the shares given to 
participants, we say that a secret sharing scheme is a perfett secret sharing scheme, 
or simply a secret sharing scheme, for the monotone access structure ~2 c 2q if 
1. Any subset A c L’? of participants enabled to recover the secret tan compute the 
secret: If A E d, then for all a E K(A) with p,,,,(a) > 0 there exists a unique 
secret s E S such that p(slu) = 1. 
2. Any subset A c 9 of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no infor- 
mation on the secret value: If A $ d, then for all s E S and for all a E A, it holds 
that p(slu) = ps(s). 
Property 1. means that the value of the shares held by A E d completely determines 
the secret s E S. Notice that the property 2. means that the probability that the secret 
is equal to s given that the shares held by A 6 JZZ are a, is the same as the a priori 
probability of the secret s. Therefore, no amount of knowledge of shares of participants 
not qualified to reconstruct the secret enables a Bayesian Opponent to modify an a priori 
guess regarding which the secret is. 
Following the approach of [17,29,31] we tan restate above conditions 1. and 2. 
using the information measures listed in Appendix A. Therefore, we say that a secret 
sharing scheme is a sharing of the secrets in S among participants in 9 such that 
1’. Any subset A c 9 of participants enabled to recover the secret tan compute the 
secret: Formally, for all A E d, it holds that H(S 1 A) = 0. 
2’. Any subset A c 9 of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no infor- 
mation on the secret value: Formally, for all A @ &‘, it holds that H(S IA) = H(S). 
Notice that H(S 1 A) = 0 means that each set of values of the shares in A corresponds to 
a unique value of the secret. In fact, by definition, H(S 1 A) = 0 is equivalent to the fact 
that for all a E K(A) with P~,~,(u) > 0 a unique s E S exists such that p(s 1 a) = 1. 
Moreover, H(S 1 A) = H(S) is equivalent to state that S and K(A) are statistically 
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independent, i.e., for all a E K(A) and for all s E S, it holds that p(s 1 a) = ps(s) and 
therefore the knowledge of a gives no information about the secret. 
2.1. The size of the shares 
One of the basic Problems in the field of secret sharing schemes is to derive bounds 
on the amount of information that must be kept secret. This is important from the 
practical Point of view since the security of any System degrades as the amount of 
secret information increases. 
Let 9 be a set of n participants and ~2 C 2g be an access structure on 9. Different 
measures of the amount of secret information that must be distributed in a secret 
sharing scheme are possible. If we are interested in limiting the maximum size of 
shares for each participant (i.e., the maximum quantity of secret information that must 
be given to any participant), then a worst-case measure of the maximum of H(P) over 
all P E 9’ naturally arises. To analyze such cases we use the information rate of & 
defined below. Given a set of secrets S, a nontrivial probability distribution ns on S, 
and a fixed secret sharing scheme C for .sl, we define 
This measure was introduced by Bricke11 and Stinson [ 161 when the probability distri- 
butions over the secret and the shares are uniform. In such a case the information rate 
reduces to log IS]/maxpCp log IK(P)I, and corresponds to the ratio between the size of 
the secret (measured in bits) and that of the largest share given to any participant. The 
optimal information rate of the access structure d is then defined as 
P*(d) = sup P(d, n,, C), 
XT 
where A’ is the space of all nontrivial probability distributions ZZs and Y is the space 
of all secret sharing schemes for the access structure d. In [ 17,291, it has been proved 
that in any secret sharing scheme the relation H(P) 2H(S) holds for any P E 9’. Since 
H(P) = H(S), for any P E S, is the optimal Situation we refer to such a scheme as 
an ideal scheme. 
In many cases it is preferable to limit the sum of the size of shares given to all 
participants. In such a case the arithmetic mean of the H(P), for P E 8, is a more 
appropriate measure. We define the average information rate as follows. Given a set 
of secrets S, a nontivial probability distribution I& on S, and a fixed secret sharing 
scheme Z for d. we define 
P(d, ns, C) = I~Ifw)/ c H(P). 
PE9 
This measure was introduced in [5,33,34] when an uniform probability distribution 
on the set of secrets is assumed. In such a case the average information rate reduces 
14 1% Pl/ CP@ log IK(P)I. Blundo et al. [ 101 analyzed secret sharing schemes by 
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means of this measure, when the probability distributions over the secret and the shares 
are uniform. If the secret and the shares are Chosen under a uniform probability distri- 
bution, considering previous measure is equivalent to considering the “average size” of 
the shares assigned to each participant to realize a secret sharing scheme. The optimal 
average information rate of the access structure d is then defined as 
P*(=@ = supxa, ns, n 
$,9- 
where dz is the space of all nontrivial probability distributions & and .F is the space 
of all secret sharing schemes for the access structure SZ. 
It is clear that, for the Same secret sharing scheme and nontrivial probability distribu- 
tion 9~ on the secret, the information rate p is no greater than the average information 
rate 5, that is p>p and 2 = p if and only if all H(P), for P E 9, have the Same 
value. In case the access structure d coincides with the closure of the edge-set of 
some graph G( V(G), E(G)), we will identify d with the graph G. As done in [ 101 
we denote, for a graph G, the optimal information rate with p”(G) and the average 
information rate with p*(G). 
Remark. We will use the optimal information rate and optimal average information rate 
to prove strong nonexistential results. In fact, any upper bound of the form p*(d) <r 
implies that for the access structure d there does not exist any secret sharing scheme 
that gives to participants shares of size r times the size of the secret, and this holds 
whatever the domain of the secret is and whatever the probability distribution on the 
domain of the secret is. It is clear that the Same measure does not give significant 
results when dealing with existential results. In such a cases, that is when we want to 
prove that secret sharing schemes with a given Performance exist, we will explicitly 
mention for which domain of the secret and for which distribution on it the secret 
sharing scheme tan be constructed. 
2.2. Auxiliary results 
In this section we recall some auxiliary results. We will improve some of them in 
the next sections and we will use others in our constructions. 
Bricke11 and Stinson [16] proved the following lower bound on the information rate 
for any graph of maximum degree d. We denote with U, the uniform probability 
distribution on the set of secrets S. 
Theorem 2.1. Let G be a graph with maximum degree d. Then for any set of secrets 
S of cardinality qa2, there exists a secret sharing scheme C with information rate 
P(G, u,TC) = ,d,2; + 1. 
In Section 3 we will Show how to improve this bound for odd d. Blundo et al. [lO] 
proved the following result for trees. 
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Lemma 2.1. Let G be a tree. Then for any set of Seerets S of cardinality q 32, there 
exists a secret sharing scheme C with information rate p(G, U,, z) = i. 
In Section 3 we will show how to improve this bound for any tree. 
The following results, proved in [ 10,441 will be used to obtain good secret sharing 
schemes for graphs with maximum degree 3. 
Theorem 2.2. Let C,, be a cycle of Iength n, n 25. For any set of secrets S of 
cardinality q2, with qan, a secret sharing scheme Z for C,, exists with information 
rate p(C,, U,,C) = +. 
The following lemmas have been proved by Capocelli et al. [ 171; we will use them 
to find new upper bounds on the information rate of access structures. Since their 
proofs are simple, we report them for reader’s convenience. 
Lemma 2.2. Let d be an access structure on a set 9 of participants and X, Y c 9. 
Let Y@xZandXuY~&‘. ThenH(X)Y)=H(S)+H(XIYS). 
Proof. The conditional mutual information Z(X; SI Y) tan be written either as H(X] Y)- 
ZZ(X]YS) or as H(S]Y)-H(SIXY). Hence, H(X]Y) = ZZ(X]YS)+ZZ(S]Y)-ZZ(S]XY). 
Because of ZZ(S]XY) = 0 for X U Y E d and H(SJY) = H(S) for Y $ &, we have 
H(X] Y) = H(S) + H(XI YS). 0 
Lemma 2.3. Let d be an access structure on a set P of participants and X, Y c S. 
Zf X U Y $!s! then H(YIX) = H(Y IXS). 
Proof. The conditional mutual information Z( Y, S]X) tan be written either as H( Y IX)- 
ZZ(Y1.U) or as H(S]X)-H(SIXY). H ence, H(YIX) = H(Ylxs)+H(slx)-H(s(xY). 
Because of H(S]X Y) = H(S]X) = H(S), for X U Y $! ~4, we have H(YJX) = 
H(Y]XS). 0 
Finally, we briefly recall a technique introduced in [lO] to obtain lower bounds on 
the information rate of a graph G. 
Suppose G is a graph, a complete multipartite covering (or CMC) of G is a set 
Zl = {Gi,..., G,} where GI,..., Gt are subgraphs of G, each edge of G occurs in at 
least one of the Gi’s, and each Gi is a complete multipartite graph. Suppose ZZj = 
{Gji,..., Gj,},j = 1,2, are two CMCs of G. For every vertex u and for j = 1,2, 
define Rj” = [{i: u E Gji}]. Th en, we define Zl, 5 ZZ2 if RIE<RZV for all v E V(G). 
Define a CMC 17 to be minimal if there is no ZZ’ # ZZ such that Zl’ 5 Zl. Let 
Zl, = {Gji ,..., Gja,},j = l,... L, comprise a complete enumeration of the minimal 
CMCS of G. For every vertex v and for j = l,...L define Rj” = [{i: u E Gji}( and 
consider the following optimization Problem cO( G): 
Minimize T 
Subject to aja0, l<jQL, 
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Ea, = 1, 
j=l 
T 3 ka,R,,, v E V(G). 
j=l 
In [lO] it is proved that if T’ is the optimal solution to O(G) then for any set of 
secrets S of cardinality (SI = 8, for qB max{tji : l<j<L,l<i<nj}, where tji the 
number of Parts in Gji, there exists a secret sharing scheme C with information rate 
p(G, u,,C) = lP*. 
3. Upper bounds on the information rate and average information rate 
In this section we will exhibit an access structure having optimal information rate 
less than $. This solves an open Problem in [ 101. The result is obtained using the 
entropy approach of [ 171. 
Consider the graph &‘Yk = (V(dYk), E(&‘P’~)),k > 1, where 
V(dYk) = {Yo,~o,~l,...r~k,~k+l,...,~2k} 
and 
As an example, the graph dYk for k = 3 is depicted in Fig. l(a). 
Theorem 3.1. The optimal information rate of the graph &yk, k > 1, satisjes 
Moreover, for any set of secrets S of cardinality qk+‘, with q > 2, there exists 
sharing scheme Cl such that p(&yk, U,, Cl) = i + 1/(4k + 2). 
YO 
XO 
XI A X2 X3 
x4 x5 X6 
YO 
XO m 
XI x2 x3 
XI x2 x3 
1 I 1 
x4 x5 xo 
Yo 
a secret 
a b 
Fig. 1. 
c 
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The optimal average information rate of &yk, k> 1, satisjes 
Moreover, for any set of Seerets S of cardinality [SI 22 there exists a secret sharing 
scheme ZZ such that p(&ypk, U,, &) = 3 + 2/(9k + 6). 
Proof. Consider the conditional entropy H(Xt . . .& 1 YO). We have 
H(~l...~klYO)=H(~,IYO)+H(~~I~~Yo)+”’+H(~kI~,...~~-IYO) 
(from (A.3)) 
2 ff(xlI r,xk+l ) + f&% 1x1 yOxk+2) 
+H(X3[~$2YO&+3) + ’ ’ ’ + H(&I& . . ..&..-1 yd&) 
(from (AS)) 
2 kH(S) (from Lemma 2.2 and (A.2)). 
On the other hand, we have also 
H(& . . .&lY,,) = H(& . ..&lYOS) (from Lemma 2.3) 
< H(X&r . . .&lY&?) (from (A.3) and (A.2)) 
d H(&( YOS) + H(.& 1x0s) + ’ ’ ’ + H(& 1x0s) 
(from (A.3) and (AS)) 
=H(&IYo)-H(S)+“*+H(&I&)-H(S) 
(from Lemma 2.2) 
< H(Xo) + . * . + H(&) - (k + l)H(S) (from (A.4)). 
Therefore, we get 
H(Xo)+H(X1)+... + H(&)>(2k + l)H(S). 
From (1) it follows that there exists i E (0, 1, . . . , k} such that 
H(X) 2 SH(S). 
Therefore, the optimal information rate p*(&Yk) is upper bounded by 
k+l 
p*(dyk)< - = 
1 
2k + 1 
‘+- 
2 4k+2’ 
From (1) and from Lemma 2.2 it follows that 
H( YO) + CH(Xi) 2 (3k + 2)H(S). 
i=O 
Therefore, the optimal average information rate of &BÝpk is upper bounded by 
2k+2 2 2 
==-+-. 
3 9k+6 
(1) 
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Actually, i + 1/(4k + 2) is the true value of the optimal information rate. This value 
tan be attained by using the CMC technique presented in [lO]. Consider the following 
two minimal complete multipartite coverings of ~3?9k: 
Ul = 
1 
{ yoxo, XI& ,..., ~o&),{~l&+l’..., &&k}} 
n2 = 
1 
{~0~0},{~0~,,~1xk+1},..., WO&W2k)}. 
(An example of these two coverings of d9’k is depicted in Figs. l(b) and (c) for 
k = 3.) Taking k copies of IZr and one copy of Ll2 there exists a secret sharing 
scheme Cr with information rate p(dYk, U,,Zr) = (k + 1)/(2k + 1) for any set of 
secrets S of cardinality q ‘fl for q 22. Thus, the optimal information rate of dYk , 
is i + 1/(4k + 2). The optimal average information rate equal to i + 2/(9k + 6) is 
attained by either Lrr or IZ2 for any set of secrets S of cardinality q 22. 0 
In case the probability distribution on the set of secrets is the uniform one, we obtain 
the following result, whose proof is immediate using Theorem 3.1 and inequality (A.l). 
As customary, we measure both the size of the shares and the size of the secret with 
the logarithm of the cardinality of the sets from which they are taken, that is, by the 
number of bits necessary to their representation. 
Corollary 3.1. Suppose ps(s) = l/]S],f or any s E S. Then any secret sharing scheme 
for the access structure dYk must give to at least a participant a share whose size 
is at least 2 - l/(k + 1) times the size of the secret. 
Theorem 3.1 is a generalization of Theorem 4.1 of [ 171. In fact if we choose k = 1 
the access structure dYk is the closure of the edge-set of 9, the path on four vertices. 
In Appendix B are depicted all graphs on six vertices that have JG!L?~ as induced 
subgraph and, therefore, have optimal information rate less than $. It turns out that the 
optimal information rate for all those graphs is equal to $, and all but one have also 
an optimal average information rate equal to t. 
Using Theorem 3.1 we tan Show the existente of access structures having average 
information rate less than J, which represented the best upper bound known so far 
[ 171 on average information rate. 
Consider the graph &k, where V(A’k) = {X,,X2,. . . ,X2k+3,&+4} and 
E(Ak) = {x&2} U {&~,&%+;,&+ix2k+3 13 Qi dk i- 2) U {X2k+3X2k+4}. 
The graph ,,+Y3 and a CMC that attains the optimal average information rate are depicted 
in Fig. 2. The following theorem holds. 
Theorem 3.2. The optimal average information rate for dk, k > 1, satis$es 
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Moreover, for any set of Seerets S of cardinality (SI >2 there exists a secret sharing 
scheme Z such that p(dk, U,, Z) = i + 1/(2k + 2). 
Proof. From Lemma 2.2 we get H(Xl)aH(S) and H(X&+d) aH(S), whereas from 
Theorem 3.1 we have 
kf2 
-jJf(X)32k + 1 
i=2 
and 
2kf3 
C H(K)32k + 1. 
i=k+3 
Thus, 
2kf4 
CH(X@4k+4. 
i=l 
Hence, 
1 1 
~(&!k)<&$ = - + -. 
2 2k+2 
It is easy to see that the following complete multipartite covering Zl of the graph &k 
meets previous beund. 
fl = {~&2,~2&, . . . ,&xk+2}> 
@3xk+3}, {&xk+4}, . . . , {Xk+2&k+2}, 
{&+3-%k+3>. . . , -%k+2-%k+3&k+3&k+4} . > 
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More precisely, there exists a secret sharing scheme C with average information rate 
p(Jk’k, U,, C) = (2k + 4)/(4k + 4) for any set of secrets S of cardinality (SI 22. 0 
3.1. A NP-completeness result 
A close look to the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 3.1 Shows that it tan be 
applied also to any access structure d on 2k + 2 participants, Ys,Xs,Xi,. . . ,Xzk, such 
that the set d-allowed defined as 
d-allowed = { Yfl~} U {&xi,x;&+; 1 1 <i <k} 
is in the access structure, i.e., &-allowed c SZ, but the set &-forbidden defined as 
d-forbidden = {X&Z . ..&Yo} U {YO&+l} U {XI . ..X.uiy~&+~+, 11 <i<k - 1) 
has no intersection with the access structure, i.e., &-forbidden f~4 = 0. Let Bk be 
the set of all access structures which satisfy the above requirements. The sequence 
(~lA,...> &) is called the children list of access structure J&’ (the name is inspired 
by the fact that the set d-allowed has the form of a tree). To maintain simpler notation 
we denote a set {al,a2,. . . , a,} by the sequence ala2 . . . a,. In case the access structure 
is the closure of a graph, the set d-forbidden tan be written as 
d-forbidden-edges = { YsXi ) 1 <i < 2k) U {Xix, 11 d i < j d k} U {&xk+j 1 1 < i < j <k}. 
Let d be an access structure on a set 9 of participants. Given a subset of participants 
9’ & 9, we define the access structure induced by 9’ as the family of sets &[9’] = 
{X E d 1 X 2 9’). Extending Theorem 3.3 of [ 161 to general access structures and 
using Theorem 3.1 we tan prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.3. Let d be an access structure on a set 9 of participants and 9” 2 .?J’. 
If &‘[P’] E gk, where k > 1, then the optimal information rates for SZ’ and sZ[VP’] 
satisfy 
and optimal average information rate for &[P’] satisjes 
Above theorem gives an upper bound on the information rate of access structures 
given that the access structure induced by a subset of participants is in Bk. We will 
use above theorem to get upper bounds on the optimal information rate and on the 
optimal average information rate of several graphs with six vertices, extending the 
results of [ 101 that computed the information rate of all graphs with five vertices. 
Unfortunately, testing for above property in general is an hard computational Problem, 
as we show that this is NP-complete. Let &’ be an access structure, a set C E d is 
a minimal set of d if A 9 SS?’ whenever A c C. Define the S~NDUCE~LSUBSTRLJCTURE 
Problem as follows: Given a set of participants g, an access structure SZ defined by 
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the family of minimal Sets which tan recover the secret and a positive integer k >3, 
determine if there is a subset 8’ G 9’ such that the induced access structure &[8’] is 
in gk. 
Theorem 3.4. ~~NDUCEDSLJBSTRUCTURE is NP-complete. 
Proof. (For definition of NP-complete Problems and notation used in this proof, we 
refer the reader to [25].) It is easy to see that ~GNDUCEDSUBSTRUCTURE E NP, since a 
nondeterministic algorithm needs only guess participants Ys,X,,Xi, . . . ,&k, and check 
in polynomial time whether the set sl-allowed is a subset of ._& and d-forbidden 
rld=0. 
We transform 3s~~ to B-INDU~E~~LJBSTR~~TIJRE. Let U = {uI,u2,...,uk_i}, k>3, 
be a set of variables and C = {ci, c2 , . . . , c,,,} be a set of clauses, each containing 3 
literals. We will construct an access structure ~-4 on a set B of participants, such that 
there is a subset of participants 9’ 2 B and the induced access structure .JZ![~‘] is in 
.$?8k if and only if C is satisfiable. 
There are 4k participants in 9: Four participants ys,xo, u, u’, and for each variable 
ui E U there are four participants ui,iii, u[,ii[ in 8. 
The access structure d consists of three components, i.e., d = dr U 62 U sd3. The 
family di is defined as 
Note that the pairs of participants in &‘i have been Chosen so that if there is a set 
9°C 9 such that &[9’] E gk, then: (1) ~O,XO,U,U’ E 9’; (2) for each pair {UiyUi},i = 
1,2,... ,k-l,exactlyoneelementisin~‘;(3)foreachpair{ul,ul}, i= 1,2,...,k-1, 
exactly one element is in 8’. 
The set d-p is defined as 
&2 = {U’ZdiU~_~, U’UiU~_l, U’UiUi_1, &Zi_,(2<i<k - 1). 
Note that the definition of the set JX!~ implies that if there is a set 8’ CB such that 
&‘[9’] E Bk, then any children list (WO, wi, ~2,. . . , wk_1) of +&‘[9’] satisfies WO = u and 
Wi E {&,Ui}, for i = 1,2,. . ., k - 1. Should it be otherwise, a set A E J& would belong 
to &‘[9’] rl d-forbidden and we could not have &[9’] E Bk, getting a contradiction. 
The set &3 is defined as 
2~43 = { li,lli~Zi,3I Ii,~li,2li,3 are the complements of the 3 literals in ci E C}. 
The construction tan be accomplished in polynomial time. We now Show that C is 
satisfiable if and only if there is a subset of participants 9’ C B whose induced access 
structure &‘[9’] is in gk. Suppose 8’ is a set of participants such that d[B’] E 9Zlk. 
Recalling the definition of &‘i, we have that u E 9’ and for each pair {ui,Ui},i = 
, k - 1, exactly one element is in 8’. Consider the truth assignment t : U -+ 
;$;dti d e ne as follows: If Ui E 9’ then t(q) = T, else t(q) = F. Let ci E C be a 
clause consisting of literals wi,i,wi,2,wi,s. Since ~i,i WQWQ is in &3, then the three 
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Fig. 3 
elements Wi,i,Wl,2,Wi,3 cannot be all in Y’, otherwise d[S’] $ Bk since {W,,i Wi,2 wi,3} E 
&-jtirbidden. If Wi,j @ Y’, for j E { 1,2,3}, then t(wi,j) = T and clause ci is satisfiable. 
On the other hand, assume that t : U -+ { T,F} is a satisfying truth assignment for 
C. Define wi and wi as follows: wi = ui and MJ! = U; if t(ui) = T, and wi = i& and 
w: = U: otherwise. Let 9’ be the set {ys,xo, u,wi,w2,. . . ,wk_l, u’,wi, w$, . . . , wL_,}. 
Then, &[S’] E Bk. 
As an example, let U = {UI,UL,U~} and C = {{UI,U*,U3},{U,,U2,u3},{U~,~2,U3)r 
{Ul, UZ, u3}, {Ul, Uz, E3}}. The set of participants is {yo,xo, v, u’, ui,Ui, ui,U{, u~,i&, UZ,?& 
ua,U3, u~,U~}. The graph representing the set _&‘i is depicted in Fig. 3. Sets ~$2 and 
LZ!~ are equal to _VZZ = {v’u~u{, v’uziii, v’ii~u~, v’i&iii, u’u~u~, v’u3iii, u’ü&, u’ü3ii~} and 
d3 = {- - - ,- - -- Ul u2 u3 Ul U2U3,ülU2U3, 241~2 u~,UIU~U~}. There are three satisfying assignments 
for C : u1 = 0, u2 = 1, 2.43 = 0; u1 = 1, UZ = 0, us = 1; and ui = 1, UZ = 1, 
U3 = 0. The sets of participants 9’ such that 6[9’] E Bq are the following: 
{yo,xo,~,ül,~2,~3,u’,~~,~2,~3}, {yo,xo,v,u~,ü2,u3,U’,~l,~2,~3}, and {yo,xo,v,ui,u2,%, 
u’,Y~, Q,Y~}, where each ri tan be either equal to r.4; or to üi. ??
4. Lower bounds on information rate and average information rate 
In this section we will give several general lower bounds on the information rate 
and on the average information rate of access structures represented by graphs. Our 
lower bounds are obtained, as customary, assuming an uniform probability distribution 
_ on the set of secrets. We first recall the following theorem by Bricke11 and Dav- 
enport in [14] stating that a complete bipartite graph admits an ideal secret sharing 
scheme. Since we will use this result several times, we repeat the proof for the reader 
convenience. 2 
Theorem 4.1. Let G be a complete bipartite graph. Then, for any set of secrets 
S of cardinality q 22, there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme Z for G, i.e., 
p(G, u,, 0 = 1. 
’ Actually, Bricke11 and Davenport proved the theorem for the general case of complete multipartite graphs, 
but we use it only in the particular case of complete bipartite graphs. 
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Proof. Let VI and V, be the Parts of G. An ideal secret sharing for G tan be con- 
structed as follows. Let q82 be an integer. Consider S = Z,. If the secret is s E S, 
then the dealer randomly chooses an element a E Z, and computes an element fl E Z, 
such that s = a + pmodq. The dealer gives the share c1 to all participants in VI and 
the share /? to all participants in Vz. It is obvious that this realizes a secret sharing 
scheme with information rate equal to 1. 0 
We first improve on the bound of Theorem 2.1 for graphs with n vertices and odd 
maximum degree d. 
Theorem 4.2. Let G = (V(G), E(G)) be a graph of n vertices and maximum degree 
d,d edd. Then, for any set of Seerets S of cardinality q”, with q32, there exists a 
secret sharing scheme z with information rate 
p(G’ “‘) = rd/21 + 11- [d/2]/n’ 
Proof. For X E V(G) let Adj(X),lnc(X), degree_one(X) be the following Sets: Adj 
(X) = {Y : (x, Y) E E(G)} is the set of vertices adjacent to X. Inc(X) = {(X, Y) : 
(X, Y) E E(G)} is the set of edges incident to X. Finally, degree_one(X) = {Y E 
Adj(X) : IZnc(Y)I = 1) is the set of vertices adjacent to X with degree 1. We will 
prove the theorem in the case IS] = 2”, the construction tan be easily extended to the 
general case ]S( = q” and q 22. 
For a vertex X E V(G) define G, as the subgraph of G such that V( G, ) = {X} U 
Adj(X) and E(G, ) = Inc(X). The graph G, is a complete multipartite graph and by 
Theorem 4.1 there is a secret sharing scheme for G, with information rate 1. Let 
G’ be the graph with vertices V(G’) = V(G) - ({X} U degree_one(X)) and edge-set 
E(G’) = E(G) - Znc(X). Assume that the secret consists of a Single bit. If we use the 
secret sharing scheme described in Theorem 3.8 of [16] for G’, then each vertex in 
Adj(X) f? V(G’) gets at most [(d - 1)/2] + 1 bits while all other vertices get at most 
rd/21 + 1 bits. We realize a secret sharing scheme for G by using both the scheme 
for G, and the scheme for G’. In the resulting scheme the vertex X receives only one 
bit, the vertices in Adj(X) fl V(G’) receive at most [(d - 1)/2] + 2 bits, while all 
remaining vertices get at most rd/21 + 1 bits. Since d is odd then [(d - 1)/2] + 2 = 
rd/21 + 1. Therefore, the above-described secret sharing schemes for G gives to any 
predeterminated vertex only one bit, while all other vertices in G get at most rd/21 + 1 
bits. Now, assume that the secret consists of n bits. Consider the scheme that for each 
bit of the secret distributes it by choosing as a predetermined vertex X each vertex of 
G in turn. The resulting secret sharing scheme, for a secret of n bits, gives to each 
vertex at most 1 + (n - 1 )( rd/21 + 1) bits. The information rate of the scheme is equal 
to 
1 
rd/21 + 1 - rd/21 /n ’ 
and the theorem follows. 0 
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For a graph G of maximum degree 3, the bound of Theorem 2.1 gives p(G, U,, C) = 
i while the bound of Theorem 4.2 gives p(G, Us, C) = 1/(3 - 2/n). The following 
theorem gives an improved bound. 
Theorem 4.3. Let G = (V(G),E(G)) be a graph of maximum degree 3 with n ver- 
tices. Then, for any set of Seerets S of cardinality q2, with q b n, there exists a secret 
sharing scheme C with information rate p(G, US, C) = $. 
Proof. Consider a partition of the edge set E(G) in cycles Cr,. . . , C, and trees Tl,. . . , Tm 
Such a partition exists for any graph G. Indeed, removing all the cycles from the 
graph we are left with a forest of comrected acyclic graphs. From Theorem 2.2 we 
know that, for any cycle of length n 25 and for any set of secrets S of cardinality 
q2, with q 2 n, there exists a secret sharing scheme with information rate equal to $. 
For a secret of 2 logq bits, the scheme gives only 3 logq bits to all vertices of the 
cycle. If a cycle has length four then from Theorem 4.1 there exists an ideal secret 
sharing scheme for any set of secrets S of cardinality 22; whereas if a cycle has 
length three, then from the main theorem of [14] there exists an ideal secret sharing 
scheme for any set of secrets S of cardinality 23. From Theorem 2.1 we know that, 
for any set of secrets S of cardinality 22, there is a secret sharing scheme for any 
tree with information rate equal to i. For a secret of 2 log q bits, the scheme given 
in [ 101 distributes only 2 log q bits to the leaves of the tree while all other vertices 
get 4 logq bits. We now realize a secret sharing scheme for G, by sharing a secret 
consisting of 2 log q separately in each tree Tl,. . . , T,,, and cycle Cr,. . . , C,. A vertex 
of G of degree one tan only be a leaf of a tree so it receives 2 logq bits. If a ver- 
tex has degree two, then either it belongs to a cycle, receiving 3 log q bits, or it is 
an intemal node of a tree and it receives 410gq bits. If a vertex has degree three, 
then it belongs to a cycle and it is the leaf of a tree, receiving 5 log q bits in total. 
Any vertex of the graph cannot be an intemal vertex of a tree and belong to a cycle; 
would it be otherwise, it should have degree four contradicting the hypothesis. Thus, 
we tan construct a secret sharing scheme for G, giving to each vertex a share of 
at most 5 log q bits for a secret of 2 log q bits. This scheme has information rate $. 
Cl 
If the number of vertices in the graph G is known, then we tan improve on the 
bound provided by Theorem 4.3 by employing the same technique used in Theo- 
rem 4.2. This gives an information rate p(G, U,,C) = 2/(5 - c/n) for a constant 
c > 0. 
Applying the same reasoning of Theorem 4.3 to graphs of odd degree d, d B 5, leads 
to an information rate p(G, U,, Z) = l/( 1.5 ld/21 + 1) which is worse than previous 
constructions. 
Regardless of the degree, it is possible to obtain better bounds for trees. We recall 
that an intemal node is a vertex of degree greater than one. 
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Theorem 4.4. Let G be a tree with n internal vertices. Then for any set of Seerets S 
of cardinality q”, with q > 2, there exists a secret sharing scheme C with information 
rate 
p(G, V,, Z) = n/(2n - 1). 
Proof. We will prove the theorem in the case ]S( = 2”, the construction tan be easily 
extended to the general case /SI = q” and q >2. In [ 101 it was showed how to obtain a 
secret sharing scheme for any tree with information rate equal to i. This scheme, for 
a secret consisting of a Single bit, gives one bit to a predeterminated vertex X E V(G) 
and to all non-internal vertices, whereas each other vertex gets two bits. Assume that the 
secret consists of n bits. Consider the scheme that for each bit of the secret distributes 
it by choosing as a predetermined vertex X each vertex of G in turn. This scheme, for 
a secret of n bits, gives to each vertex at most 2(n - 1) + 1 = 2n - 1 bits. Thus 
p(G, V,, Z) = n/(2n - 1). 0 
If only the number of vertices is known, what tan we say on the information rate 
of a graph G? The maximum degree of G tan be as bad as n - 1. Thus, the bound 
of [16] gives p*(G)> l/( [(n - 1)/2] + l), while the bound of Theorem 4.2 gives 
p*(G)> l/( [(n - 1)/2] + 1 - [(n - 1)/21/n), if n is even. 
In this last part of the Paper, we present general lower bounds on the optimal 
information rate and optimal average information rate for any graph G with n vertices. 
The lower bounds are obtained by using known results on the covering of the edges 
of a graphs by means of complete bipartite graphs. 
Tuza [46] proved that the edge-set of an arbitrary graph G tan be covered by 
complete bipartite subgraphs Gi ( V( Gr ), E( Gr )), . . . , GT( V( GT), E( GT)) such that 
EL, (V(G)1 <3n2/2 1 og n + o(n2/ log n). We now use again Theorem 4.1, namely that 
there exists a secret sharing scheme for each Gi with information rate equal to 1. We 
tan construct a secret sharing scheme for G by sharing the secret separately in each 
Gi. In this way we need to generate a total of 3n2/2 log n + o(n2/ log n) shares, each of 
them of the Same size as the secret. Thus, we get that the average size of a share given 
to any participant is less than 3n/2 log n+o(n/ log n). Therefore, we get that the optimal 
average information rate for any graph G with n vertices is greater than n times the 
inverse of 3n2/(2 logn)+ f (n), where ) f (n)l < .zn2/ log n, for all E > 0 and sufficiently 
large n. Thus, the average information rate is greater than (2 log n)/3n + g(n), where 
Is(n>l~(2c/3(s + 3/2))(logn)/n. 
Feder and Motwani [23] proved that the Problem of partitioning the edges of a graph 
G into complete bipartite graphs such that the sum of the cardinalities of their vertex 
sets is minimized is NP-complete. However, they proved that the edge set of a graph 
G = (V,E), with ) VI = n and (El = m tan be partitioned into complete bipartite graphs 
with sum of the cardinalities of their vertex sets O((m log(n2/m))/log n), and presented 
an efficient algorithm to compute such a partition. Using their result and again sharing 
the secret in each complete bipartite graph with Bricke11 and Davenport’s algorithm, 
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it follows that there is a secret sharing scheme with average information rate at least 
O((n log n)l(m log(n2/m))). 
Finally, we recall a result of Erdös and Pyber [22] (see also [36]) which states that 
edges of a graph G with n vertices tan be partitioned into complete bipartite graphs 
such that each vertex of G is contained by at most O(n/ log n) complete bipartite graphs. 
This result, together with Theorem 4.1, directly implies that the optimal information 
rate of G is p*(G) = R((logn)/n). 
These results tan be summarized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.5. Let G be a graph with n vertices and m edges. Then, for any set 
of secrets S of cardinality q 22 there exist secret sharing schemes Cl and C2 with 
average information rate 
P(G,u,,zl) > - 
and 
respectively. Moreover, there exists a secret sharing scheme C3 with information rate 
5. Comments 
Since this Paper was submitted in November 1992, some of the results in it have been 
improved. We briefly summarize some of these improvements now. Recently, using the 
information-theoretic methods developed by the authors, Csirmaz [19] proved that there 
exists an access structure on n participants whose information rate is upper bounded by 
logn/n; whereas van Dijk [21] proved the existente of a graph-based access structure 
on n participants whose average information rate is upper bounded by 2/ logn. It is 
proved in [44, Theorem 5.21 that the information rate for a graph on n vertices and 
maximum degree d is at least 2/(d + 1). This improves Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 for 
connected graphs. In [9] a construction technique is proposed to produce classes of 
access structures with information rate bounded away from 1. 
Finally, we mention that in the Paper [12] it has been proved that if a secret sharing 
scheme C for the access strucure d is perfett when one assumes a given probability 
distribution on the Sets of secrets, then C is perfett for any probability distribution 
on the sets of secrets. It is also proved that for any access structure d, if X U Y E d 
but Y $ ._vZ then H(X) > log ]S] + H(XI YS). This last result allows to directly derive 
lower bounds on the size of shares in secret sharing schemes without the necessity 
of resorting to the case in which the probability distribution on the set of secrets is 
uniform. 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we review the basic concepts of Information Theory we will use. 
For a complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised to consult [20,24]. We 
will also recall some basic terminology from Graph Theory. 
Given a probability distribution {p(x)} xE~ on a set X, we define the entropy of 
ZH(X), as 
H(X)= -CP(~)l%P(X) 
XEX 
(all logarithms in this Paper are of base 2). The entropy H(X) is a measure of the 
average uncertainty one has about which element of the set X has been Chosen when 
the choices of the elements from X are made according to the probability distribution 
{P(X)LEX. The entropy satisfies the following property 
O<H(X)< log 1x1, CA.11 
where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists ns E X such that p(x0) = 1; H(X) = log IX] 
if and only if p(x) = l/]X], for all x E X. 
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution {p(x, Y)}~~Q,~Y on their 
Cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(X]Y) is defined as 
w4Y) = -yg&4Y)P(XlY)l% PCXIY). 
From the definition of conditional entropy, it is easy to see that 
H(XlY)>O. (A.2) 
If we have n + 1 sets Xi , . . . ,X,, Y, the entropy of Xi . . . X,, given Y tan be expressed 
as 
H(X~...X,IY)=H(X,IY)+H(X~IX~Y)+...+H(XnIX~...X,_~Y) (A.3) 
The mutual information I(X; Y) between X and Y is defined by Z(X; Y) = H(X) - 
H(XIY) = H(Y) - H(YIX), since it is always nonnegative one gets 
H(X)>H(XIY). (A.4) 
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Given n + 2 sets X, Y, Zi, . . . , Z,, and a joint probability distribution on their Cartesian 
product, the conditional mutual information Z(X; Y]Zi, . ,Z,,) between X and Y given 
Zi,...,Z,, tan be written as 
Z(X;YIZ ,>..., Z,)=H(XIZ ,,..., Z,)-H(XIZ ,,..., ZnY). 
Since the conditional mutual information is always nonnegative we get 
H(XI-5 ,..., Z,)>H(XIZI ,..., Z,,Y). (-4.5) 
We now present some basic terminology from graph theory. A graph, G = (V(G), 
E(G)) consists of a finite nonempty set of vertices V(G) and a set of edges E(G) & 
V(G) x V(G). Graphs do not have loops or multiple edges. We consider only undi- 
rected graphs. In an undirected graph the pair of vertices representing any edge is 
unordered. Thus, the pairs (X, Y) and (Y,X) represent the Same edge. To avoid over- 
burdening the notation we often describe a graph G by the list of all edges E(G). 
We will use reciprocally (X, Y) and X Y to denote the edge joining the vertices 
X and Y. G is connected if any two vertices are joined by a path. The complete 
graph K,, is the graph on n vertices in which any two vertices are joined by an 
edge. The complete multipartite graph K,,,,,,,...,,, is a graph on Ei=, ni vertices, in 
which the vertex set is partitioned into subsets of cardinality ni (1 <id t) called Parts, 
such that XY is an edge if and only if X and Y are in different Parts. If G is 
a graph, then the graph GI is Said to be a subgraph of G if V(Gi) C: V(G) and 
E(GI) C E(G). 
Appendix B 
In this appendix we analyze all graphs who have optimal information rate less than 
z accordingly to Theorem 3.3. The schemes for these graphs are obtained by using 
the multiple construction Technique [ 101 based on complete multipartite coverings of 
the graph. The optimal information rate is not greater than z and the optimal average 
information rate is less than or equal to 4 for all graphs from Theorem 3.3. All these 
results are summarized in Table 1, and the first CMC of each graph gives the scheme 
with average information rate showed in Table 1. Some of the minimal CA4Cs for 5 
graphs on 6 vertices are depicted in Fig. 4. 
Table 1 
Information rate and average infomation rate 
Graph Information rate Average information rate 
G.G.G.G p’ = 315 -* = 314 P 
G p’ = 315 213 <;’ <3/4 
304 C. Blundo et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 154 (1996) 283-306 
A A A 
B 
GI c 
n 
D 
C H-4 
B 1 
D BB B 
C 
I 1 
D C 
E F E F 
i > 
D 
E F 
G,zfx yIjE 
ABDF s B DE ABB D F A B DD F 
l-4 l-4 l-4 
. ‘es ?? _v .DDe: 
ABCE A BBG A B C CE 
D F 
A 
Kl B 
C E 
Fig. 4. 
References 
[l] J.C. Benaloh and J. Leichter, Generalized Secret Sharing and Monotone Functions, in: S. Goldwasser, 
ed., Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 88, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 403 (Springer, 
Berlin, 1985) 27-35. 
[2] A. Beutelspacher, How to say ‘no’, in: Quisquater and Vandewalle eds., Aduances in Cryptology - 
EUROCRYPT 89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 434 (Springer, Berlin, 1990) 491496. 
C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 154 (1996) 283-306 305 
[3] G.R. Blakley, Safeguarding cryptographic keys, in: Proc. AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conf, 
(June 1979) 313-317. 
[4] B. Blakley, G.R. Blakley, A.H. Chan, and J.L. Massey, Threshold schemes with disenrollment, in: E. 
Brickell, ed., Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ‘92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 740 
(Springer, Berlin, 1993) 546554. 
[5] C. Blundo, Secret sharing schemes for access structures based on graphs, Tesi di Laurea, University 
of Salerno, ltaly, 1991 (in Itahan). 
[6] C. Blundo, A. Cresti, A. De Santis, and U. Vaccaro, Fully Dynamit Secret Sharing Schemes, in: D.R. 
Stinson, ed., Advances in Cryptology - CR YPTO 93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 773 
(Springer, Berlin, 1994) 126135. 
[7] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, G. Di Crescenzo, A. Giorgio Gaggia, and U. Vaccaro, Multi-Secret Sharing 
Schemes, in: Y. Desmedt, ed., Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 94, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Vol. 839 (Springer, Berlin, 1994) 150-163. 
[8] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, L. Gargano and U. Vaccaro, Secret Sharing Schemes with Veto Capabilities, 
in: C. Cohen, S. Litsyn, A. Lobstein and G. Zemor, eds., Proceedings of the French-Israeli Workshop 
in Algebraic Coding, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 781 (Springer, Berlin, 1994) 82-89. 
[9] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, A. Giorgio Gaggia and U. Vaccaro, New bounds on the information rate of 
secret sharing schemes, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 41 (1995) 549-554. 
[lO] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, D.R. Stinson and U. Vaccaro, Graph decomposition and secret sharing 
schemes, J. Cryptology 8 (1995) 39-64; preliminary version in: R. Rueppel, ed., Advances in 
Cryptology ~ EUROCRYPT ‘92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 658 (Springer, Berlin, 
1993) 1-24. 
[l l] C. Blundo, A. De Santis and U. Vaccaro, Efficient sharing of many secrets, in: P. Enjalbert, A. Finke1 
and K.W. Wagner, eds., Proc. STACS ‘93 (10th Symp. on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science). 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 665 (Springer, Berlin, 1993) 6922703. 
[12] C. Blundo, A. De Santis and U. Vaccaro, On secret sharing schemes, Technical Report, Univ. of 
Salemo, 1995. 
[13] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, and U. Vaccaro, Randomness in distribution protocols, in: S. Abiteboul and 
E. Shamir, eds., Proc. 2lst Internat. Colloq. on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 
‘94) Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 820 (Springer, Berlin, 1994) 568-579. 
[ 141 E.F. Bricke11 and D.M. Davenport, On the classification of ideal secret sharing schemes, J.. Cryptology 
4 (1991) 123-124. 
[15] E.F. Bricke11 and D.R. Stinson, The detection of cheaters in threshold schemes, SIAM .I. Discrete 
Math. 4 (1991) 502-510. 
[16] E.F. Bricke11 and D.R. Stinson, Some improved bounds on the information rate of perfett secret sharing 
schemes, J. Cryptology 5 (1992) 1533166. 
[17] R.M. Capocelli, A. De Santis, L. Gargano and U. Vaccaro, On the size of shares for secret sharing 
schemes, J. Cryptology 6 (1993) 157-168. 
[18] M. Carpentieri, A. De Santis and U. Vaccaro, Size of shares and probability of cheating in threshold 
schemes, in: T. Helleseth, ed., Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT ‘93, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Vol. 765 (Springer, Berlin, 1994) 118-125. 
[ 191 L. Csirmaz, The size of a share must be large, to appear in: A. De Santis, ed., Aduances in Cryptology 
EUROCRYPT ‘94, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 950 (Springer, Berlin, 1995). 
[20] 1. Csiszar and J. Körner, Information Theory. Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryiess Systems 
(Academic Press, 1981). 
[21] M. van Dijk, On the information rate of perfett secret sharing schemes, preprint, 1994. 
[22] P. Erdös and L. Pyber, unpublished. 
[23] T. Feder and R. Motwani, Clique partition, graph compression and speeding-up algorithms, in: Proc. 
23rd Annual ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (New Orleans, 1991) 123-133. 
[24] R.G. Gallager, Information Theory and Reliable Communications (John Wiley, New York, 1968). 
[25] M. Garey and D. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: a Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness 
(W.H. Freeman, New York, 1979). 
[26] 1. Ingemarsson and G.J. Simmons, A protocol to set up shared secret schemes without the assistance 
of a mutually trusted Party, in: Advances in Cryptology ~ CRYPTO 90, Menezes and Vanstone eds., 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 473 (Springer, Berlin, 1991) 266-282. 
306 C. Blundo et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 154 (1996) 283-306 
[27] M. Ito, A. Saito and T. Nishizeki, Secret sharing scheme realizing general access structure, in: Proc. 
IEEE Global Telecommunications Co&, Globecom 87, (Tokyo, Japan, 1987). 
[28] W.-A. Jackson, K.M. Martin, and C.M. O’Keefe, Multisecret threshold schemes, in: D.R. Stinson, ed., 
Aduances in Cryptology -CRYPTO ‘93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 773 (Springer, 
Berlin, 1994) 126135. 
[29] E.D. Kamin, J.W. Greene and M.E. Hellman, On secret sharing Systems, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 
IT-29, (1) (1983) 3541. 
[30] D.E. Knuth and A.C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform random number generation, in: J.F. Traub, 
ed., Algorithms and Complexity (Academic Press, New York, 1976) 357428. 
[31] S.C. Kothari, Generalized linear threshold schemes, in: G.R. Blakley and D. Chaum, eds., Aduances 
in Cryptology - CR YPTO 84, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol 196 (Springer Berlin, 1985) 
231-241. 
[32] R.J. McEliece and D.V. Sarwate, On sharing secrets and Reed-Solomon Codes, Comm. ACM 24 
(1981) 583-584. 
[33] K.M. Martin, Discrete structures in the theory of secret sharing, Ph.D. Thesis, Univers@ of London, 
1991. 
[34] K.M. Martin, New secret sharing schemes from old, J. Combin. Math. Combin. Comput., 14 (1993) 
65-67. 
[35] M. Naor and A. Shamir, Vistra1 cryptography, to appear in: A. De Santis, ed., Aduances in Cryptology 
_ Eurocrypt ‘94, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 950 (Springer, Berlin). 
[36] L. Pyber, Covering the edges of a graph by..., in: L. Lovbsz, D. Miklos and T. Szönyi, eds., Sets, 
Graphs and Numbers, Colloquia Mathematica Sec., Janos Bolyai (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1992) 
583-610 
[37] T. Rabin and M. Ben-Or, Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority, in: 
Proc. 21st Ach4 Symp. on Theory of Computing (1989) 73-85. 
[38] A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Comm. ACM 22 (11) (1979) 612613. 
[39] G.J. Simmons, Robust shared secret schemes or ‘how to be Sure you have the right answer even 
though you don’t know the question’, Congr. Numer. 68 (1989) 215-248. 
[40] G.J. Simmons, Prepositioned shared secret and/or shared control schemes, in: Proc. Aduances in 
Cryptology - CRYPTO ‘89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 434 (Springer, Berlin, 1990) 
436467. 
[41] G.J. Simmons, An Introduction to Shared Secret andlor Shared Control Schemes and Their 
Application, Contemp. Cryptology (IEEE Press, 1991) 441497. 
[42] D.R. Stinson, An explication of secret sharing schemes, Designs, Codes and Cryptography 2 (1992) 
357-390. 
[43] D.R. Stinson, New general lower bounds on the information rate of secret sharing schemes, in: E. 
Brickell, ed., Proc. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ‘92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Vol. 740, (Springer Berlin, 1993) 170-184. 
[44] D.R. Stinson, Decomposition constructions for secret sharing schemes, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 
40 (1994) 118-125. 
[45] M. Tompa and H. Wall, How to share a secret with cheaters, J. Cryptology 1 (1988) 133-138. 
[46] Z. Tuza, Covering of graphs by complete bipartite subgraphs; complexity of O-l matrices, 
Combinatorica 4 (1) (1984) 111-116. 
